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THE

AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
MARCH-APRIL,

1920.

THE COURTS AS AUTHORIZED LEGAL ADVISORS
OF THE PEOPLE.
It is doubtful whether American legal institutions have
witnessed a more far-reaching procedural reform since
New York adopted its Code of Civil Procedure in 1848, than
the movement toward the authorization of judicial declarations of rights which has received its chief impetus from
legislation enacted in three American States during the
past year. A -somewhat timid step in this direction was
taken by the New Jersey Chancery Practice Act of 1915,
but it disclosed a want of confidence in the broad effectiveness of. the remedy. Now for the first time American legislation has definitely committed itself to the principle that
an adequate system of remedial law requires courts to
offer remedies in advance of the happening or even of the
threat of any wrongful act and to authoritatively advise
parties as to what their legal rights may be in the circumstances in which they find themselves.
The three States referred to are Michigan, Wisconsin,
and Florida, and the acts which they have passed will
doubtless serve as suggestive models for much more legislation, both State and Federal.' The full extent of the
revolution which this legislation has accomplished in the
The Acts referred to are as follows: Michigan, Pub. Acts, 1919, No.
150, approved May 2; Wisconsin

VOL. LIV.

Laws, 1919, chap. 242, approved
May 27; Florida Laws, 1919, -No.
75, approved June 6.

(161)
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theory of the functions of courts of justice is imperfectly
understood even in the States where it has been enacted.
And the immense possibilities for enlarging the usefulness
of the courts which the new practice offers may well attract
the attention and appeal to the interest of all Americans
who believe that in the effective administration of justice
lies the surest safeguard against disloyalty and anarchy.
It is here proposed to analyze the character and scope
of this radical departure from the conventional view of the
functions of courts, and to show how delicately and how
powerfully it can adjust itself to the administration of modern justice. And to this end it will first be necessary to.
glance at the prevailing theory of judicial action.
In a recent opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States, Justice Holmes makes this interesting observation:
"The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power, although in civilized times it is not necessary to maintain that
power throughout proceedings properly begun."'
An analysis of this language brings out a double antithesis. There is first proposed a distinction between the
existence and the exercise of physical power as the basis
of judicial authority. And there is the further suggestion
that this distinction, as a practical feature of administrative justice, depends on the presence or absence, which in
effect means the degree, of civilization.
To paraphrase Justice Holmes' statement we therefore
have substantially the following proposition:
In early times the basis of jurisdiction is the existence
and the constant assertion of physical power over the parties to the action, but as civilization advances the mere existence of such power tends to make its exercise less and
less essential.
If this is true, it must be because there is something in
civilization itself which diminishes the necessity for a re2

McDonald

v.

Mabee

(decided

March

porter 342.

6, 1917),

37 Sup. Ct. Re-
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sort to actual force in sustaining the judgments of courts.
And it is quite clear that civilization does supply an element which is theoretically capable of entirely supplanting
the exercise of force in the assertion of jurisdiction. This
is respect for law. If the parties to the action desire to
obey the law, a mere determination by the court of their
reciprocal rights and duties is enough. No sheriff with his
writ of injunction or execution need shake the mailed fist
of the State in the faces of the litigants. The judgment of
the court merely directs the will of the parties, and the performance of duty becomes the automatic consequence of the
declaration of right.
It is not to be assumed that the peaceful acquiescence of
the highly civilized man in the legal findings of the court
implies any loss of power in the court itself. Quite the contrary. The greater the ease with which the court's findings
impose themselves on litigants, the more the real power of
the court is demonstrated. But the force behind the finding
of the court has become a latent instead of an active force.
This transition is possible, however, only when the existence of the force is so well recognized and so clearly understood that no one would think it worth while to put it to
the test. The entire cessation of actual coercive measures
on the part of the court would therefore mark, not the disappearance, but the perfection of the rule of force.'
The modern observer, noting this correlation between
social progress and the decline in the need for outward display of force in the administration of justice, may well ask
himself why we have not done better than we appear to
have done. If the existence of force is enough, without its
exercise, to sustain the court in its findings, why do we not
show a realization of that fact in our remedial machinery?
If the power of the State stands irresistibly behind our
judicial decisions, -why take so much pains to clothe them
with the outward show of authority? Why display the
Salmond, Jurisprudence, Ed. 4, p. 66.
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sheriff and his writ 'With so much ostentation? We do not
arm our traffic policemen with guns and cutlasses. Why
insist that the court must always rattle the sabre?
To make a specific application of this general criticism,
let it be asked why our judicial system does not everywhere provide a means for merely determining and declaring rights. If our civilization is not a sham, and the State
is understood to be equal to the task of enforcing the decrees of its courts, a mere declaration may serve every purpose of an order, and the order will become unnecessary. A
declaration by the court that A is entitled to the immediate
possession of a chattel in B's possession, should be equally
effective in A's behalf as a judgment that A do have and
recover of B the possession of the chattel. A judicial
declaration that a certain city ordinance is invalid ought to
serve equally as well as an injunction against its enforcement. Furthermore, the remedial possibilities in such
declaratory judgments are much greater than in judgments
for relief, and they open up an entirely new field for judicial usefulness, as will be hereinafter pointed out.
The answer to the question, why our courts have not been
accustomed to make declarations of right, with or without
relief, is probably historical, and lies in the philosophical
conceptions of rights and remedies which have long been
current in common law jurisprudence.
The common law was wedded to the idea of a wrongful
act on somebody's part as a necessary condition precedent
to judicial action.
Thus Holland, speaking of remedial rights, or rights of
recourse to courts of justice, says: "The causes, or 'investitive facts,' of remedial rights are always infringements
of antecedents rights . . . ' And again, he says: "So long
as all goes well, the action of the law is dormant. When
the balance of justice is disturbed by wrongdoing, or even
by a threat of it, the law intervenes to restore, as far as pos4 Jurisprudence, Ed. 9, p. 310.
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sible, the status Quo ante."5 And in still further emphasis
of this same characteristic of the court, as an ex post facto
agency, he says: "If all went smoothly, antecedent, or
primary, rights would alone exist. Remedial, or sanctioning rights are merely part of the machinery provided by
the State for the redress of injury done to antecedent rights.
This whole department of law is, in an especial sense 'added
because of transgressions.' I"
Salmond expresses the same view as to the function of
courts and the conditions under which they may be used by
litigants. He says: "Both in civil and in criminal proceedings there is a wrong (actual or threatened) complained
of. For the law will not enforce a right except as against
-a person who has already violated it, or who has at the
least already shown an intention of doing so. Justice is administered only against wrongdoers, in act or in intent.'I"
One of the most widely quoted analyses of a remedial
right, which is merely the right to resort to a court of justice, is that made by Pomeroy, in which he says: '
.
Every remedial right arises out of an antecedent primary
right and corresponding duty and a delict or breach of such
primary right and duty by the person on whom the duty
rests. Every judicial action must therefore involve the following elements: a primary right possessed by the plaintiff,
and a corresponding primary duty devolving upon the defendant; a delict or wrong done by the defendant which consisted in a breach of such primary right and duty; a remedial right in favor of the plaintiff, and a remedial duty resting on the defendant springing from this delict, and finally
the remedy or relief itself. Every action, however com"plicated or however simple, must contain these essential
elements. "I
The foregoing views make no distinction between legal
and equitable actions, but treat remedial rights generically.
Jurisprudence, p. 306.
aJurisprudence, p. 139.
7 Jurisprudence, p. 71.

8 Code Remedies

347.

(4th Ed.),

Sec.

54.

AMERICAN LAW REVIEW.

That the two divisions of the law operate upon the same
theory of remedial justice, in respect of the point now under
consideration, is quite obvious. Thus, 'injunctions are
granted to restrain threatened wrongs, specific performance is decreed in case of breach of certain contracts, various remedies are available against those who are guilty
of fraud or whose claims wrongfully rest on accident or
mistake, an accounting may be had to test the accounts of
those who are charged to have profited at the plaintiff's expense, titles are quieted against those wrongfully asserting
rights hostile to the title of the plaintiff. In the case of
bills for discovery, there is usually an action at law to
which the bill is ancillary, and furthermore the party against
whom the discovery is sought may be deemed to be wrongfully refusing to disclose. In all of these cases coercive relief is granted. A single exception serves only to make the
rule more striking, and this is the administrative control
exercised by courts of equity over trusts, permitting a resort by the trustee to the court to obtain a judicial construction of his powers and responsibilities under the terms of
the trust instrument.
Proof of the accuracy of this summary of, the attitude of
c.ourts of equity, in accordance with which they refuse to
take jurisdiction of cases not calling for coercive relief, may
be found in the express language of our courts. Thus in
Woods v. Fuller,' the Supreme Court of Maryland said:
"A court of equity will not take jurisdiction, unless it can
afford -immediate relief . . . It must be borne in mind that
the decree of a court of equity, and not its opinion, is the
instrument through which it acts in granting relief. However sound and clear such opinion may be, as an abstract
proposition of law, yet if the principle it declares cannot be
carried, into effect by a decree, in the case in which it is
given, it is wholly valueless, and an idle and nugatory act."
In Greeley v. Nashua'1 the city of Nashua filed a bill to
9 (1884:)

61 Md. 457.

18 (1882)

62 N. H. 166.
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determine its rights to certain property devised to it under
a will, and the Supreme Court of New Hampshire said:
"The plaintiffs . . . request the court to inform them what
their legal rights and those of the defendants are in the
property devised. The court might with equal propriety
be called upon by the parties interested to advise them regarding the title to land, the construction of a contract, or
any other question of law. Such questions are not ordinarily adjudicated until it become necessary to decide them
in proceedings instituted for the redress of wrongs."
And in B~vans v. Bevans"1 a bill was filed to obtain the
construction of a will with respect to the title to real estate.
The Chancellor of New Jersey said: " . . . It is settled that
the court will not express opinions in regard to construction
for the mere information of parties, disconnected from some
equitable relief sought."
In accordance with this view of the defendant as an alleged wrongdoer, and the action as one founded upon his
actual or threatened wrong, it is quite true that a judgment
for relief against him would. always be appropriate, and
would fully meet t'he situation. So the law reasoned, and so
it ruled. If coercive relief might always be granted, it ought
always be granted, for why make a mere declaration of right
against a wrongdoer who is before the court and subject to
its power. Why merely tell him that he has no right to do
as he proposes when the court can just as well prohibit the
act. Why merely advise when it can as well command?
The United States has, in every department of its legal
practice, aside from the legislation referred to, accepted
without question the foregoing theory of remedial justice.
We have not allowed our developing civilization, with its
constantly increasing respect for law, to produce any effect
upon judicial functions. We have refused to allow parties
to appear in court except under conditions which permit a
display of force by the judicial arm of the State.
it (1905)

69 N. J. Eq. 1.
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England has been much more enterprising. In 1852 parliament took the first step to abandon this archaic conception of remedial law. In that year an act was passed amending the practice of the High Court of Chancery, and one of
the sections of that act provided as follows:
"No Suit in the said Court shall be open to Objection on
the Ground that a merely declaratory Decree or Order is
sought thereby, and it shall be lawful for the Court to make
binding Declarations of Right without granting consequential Relief.""
This statute, while striking in its novelty, was subject
to strict limitations. It applied only to courts of chancery,
and it was construed to embrace only those cases where
there was consequential relief which might be granted, but
which the parties did not care to ask for or receive.'" It did
not authorize anybody who had an apprehension that some
day, in the happening of some possible event, another might
make a claim against him, to institute a suit to have it declared that there was no ground of claim." It did not, in
other words, authorize a declarator, as this proceeding was
used in certain situations under the Scotch law.1"
But while the act was so closely circumscribed in its operation, the judges did not seem to be entirely agreed that
there was any real occasion for so narrow a restriction upon
declarations of right. Thus in Jackson v. Turnley" the
vice chancellor said: "Now it is urged that it would be extremely convenient, if whenever a party has reason to apprehend that another will make an attack upon him, he should
be entitled to come to this court, and to ask to be relieved
from that danger, by having it declared by a decsion that
there is no such right; . . . nor do I see that from the exer.15 and 16 Vict., c. 86, .s. 50.
v. Lord Kensington
(1856), 2 K. & J. 753, 761.
14"Jackson
v. Turnley (1853), 1
Drew. 617, 627.
12

13 Rooke

1 Rooke v.
Lord Kensington,
supra; Grove v. Bastard, 2 Ph. 619;
Erskine on the Law of Scotland,
461.
1a Supra, note 13, at p. 626.
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cise of it (such a jurisdiction) any mischief could result to
the defendant."
And in 1876, in Cox v. Barker, 17 James, L. J., referring to
the cases construing this statute, said that it appeared to
him "the court adopted rather a narrow view. . . ." But
the court never attempted to enlarge the scope of the statute
by construction.
But reforms moved swiftly in England. In 1873 the Judicature Act completely broke the shackles with which conventionality had burdened the administration of justice.
And in the rejuvenation which the law experienced, all the
limitations upon declaratory judgments which the old statute had retained, were swept away. The new rule was put
into force in 1.883, as Rule 5 of Order 25, and provided as
follows:
"No action or proceeding shall be open to objection, on
the ground that a merely declaratory judgment or order is
sought thereby, and the court may make binding declarations of right whether any consequential relief is or could be
claimed or not."
This rule introduced "an innovation of a very important
kind," to use the words of Justice Lindley." It threw open
to the court the right to do just what the Chancellor of New
Jersey declared in Bevans v. Bevans, supra, that courts
would never do, namely, "express opinions in regard to
construction for the mere information of parties. .... "
Later, another rule was added which provided a special
remedy in a class of cases originally embraced within the
terms of the foregoing rule, stating that:'
"In any Division of the High Court, any person claiming
to be interested under a deed, will, or other written instrument, may apply by originating summons for the determination of any question of construction arising under the
17

3 Ch. D. 359, 370.

is Ellis v. Duke of
(1899), 1 Ch. 494, 515.

Bedford
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instrument, and for a declaration of the rights of the per.sons interested. ',s
For nearly forty years the English courts have exercised this jurisdiction, both at law and in equity, of advising
parties as to their rights, with or without coercive relief at
the option of the parties.
The American legislation already referred to, is based
expressly upon these English rules.
The Michigan statute"0 was the first of the three to be
passed, and is the broadest in its scope. It substantially
enacts the provisions and uses the language of the English
rules quoted above. It provides that a declaration of rights
may be obtained by means of ordinary proceedings either
at law or in equity or by a petition on either side of the
court. It provides for the summary granting of further
relief, on an order to show cause, if the declaration is not
observed by the parties. It provides for the submission to
a jury of legal issues of fact, with or without special interrogatories, and it covers the matter of costs, putting them
ultimately under the control of the supreme court. It meets
the demand for promptness in the ascertainment of rights
by authorizing any case, which seeks a declaration only,
without other relief, to be brought on for early hearing as
in case of a motion on four days' notice. And finally, it declares that the act is to be deemed remedial and is to be liberally construed and liberally administered with a view to
making the courts more serviceable to the people.
The Wisconsin act' follows the English rules somewhat.
less literally in defining the scope of the remedy, limits the
remedy to equitable actions, and allows it to be used only
when a substantial doubt or controversy exists as to the
rights of parties and either public or private interests will
be promoted by a, declaration. It is silent on the other matters covered by the Michigan act.
it) Order
1893.

54a, rule

1, passed

in

21 See note 1, supra.
21

See note 1, supra.
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The Florida act 2 2 still further limits the scope of the
declaration of rights, authorizing it only in equitable proceedings and only for the determination of questions of construction arising under a deed, will, contract in writing
or other instrument. It requires the proceedings to conform to the general rules of chancery practice, but authorizes the Supreme Court to change or add to the rules in administering this act. The statute follows substantially the
language of order 54a, rule 1, of the English rules.
The Michigan act was expressly drawn with the language
of the English rules for the purpose of obtaining the benefit
of the many adjudications of the English courts in regard
to the practice, and the Wisconsin and Florida acts, as far
as they go, are so nearly in harmony with the terms of the
English rules that the same results were doubtless anticipated there. It is clear, therefore, that a study of the English cases will furnish the best measure of the possibilities
of these new American ventures into the field of remedial
justice.
Now, two different cases, based upon different principles,
are presented by the English rules.
1. We have first the case where coercive relief might be
had, but it is not desired. Here there is merely a new
remedial right granted to the plaintitff. He has a cause of
action of the conventional type,. but he wants to use it for a
new purpose. Instead of asking that the defendant be
ordered to perform his contract, he only wants the court to
assure him and inform the defendant that he has a right to
performance. Instead of enjoining the defendant from taking certain action, he merely asks the court to advise him
and the defendant whether the latter has a right to take it.
The advantages of asking advice instead of coercive relief
are important. In the first place it presents in the pleading
a specific and express issue of law, which can usually be an',"
See note 1, supra. This act
goes no further than the New Jer-

sey Chancery Practice Act of 1915,
•chap. 116 of the laws of that year.

54.

AMERICAN

LAW REVIEW.

swered yes or no, and which will settle the controversy between the parties. In this way the scope of the legal inquiry
presented by the pleadings is clarified and limited. Fur..
thermore, the issue of law is not one which must, as in case
of a demurrer, be developed without any accompanying issue of fact. It is usually an issue of law to be decided upon
the outcome of the trial or hearing, so that almost every
case is capable of being presented as a case for advice. Thus
a declaration of right may be asked as to a contract which
plaintiff alleges contains certain provisions. If the defendant denies some of the terms alleged, the declaration of
right will be based on the terms which the evidence substantiates. If one were inclined to question the'advantage of
this procedure in simplifying the issues, a glance through
some of the current English reports would convince him of
its effect. The question to be decided is always the correctness of the declaration asked, and the court has only to answer the specific questions thus put to it.
By asking for the declaration of right the party makes
definite and certain the theory of his case, and the court is
never at a loss to understand exactly what is in issue between the parties.
2 But there is a second result which this procedure
accomplishes in cases where coercive relief might be had,
and that is a psychological one. Every case may by this
means become, in appearance at least, a friendly suit. There
is no doubt that the personal animosities developed by litigation are serious drawbacks to the usefulness of the courts.
To sue is to fight, and fights make endless feuds. Parties
hesitate to resort to the courts because they. shrink from a
state of war with their neighbors or busineses associates.
But if the courts could operate as diplomatic instead of belligerent agencies, less hesitation would be felt over recourse
to them, and less strain would be put upon the friendly
relations of the parties. To ask the court merely to say
whether you have certain contract rights as against the de-
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fendant is a very different thing from demanding damages
or an injunction against him. When you ask for a declaration of right only, you treat him as a gentleman. When
von ask coercive relief you treat him as a wrongdoer. That
is the whole difference between diplomacy and war; the former assumes that both parties wish to do right, the latter is
based on an accusation of wrong. A request for a declaratiton of right plainly implies full confidence that the defendant will promptly and voluntarily do his duty as soon as the
court points it out to him. It indicates a willingness to rely
on the defendant's sense of honor, as a sufficient.remedy.
It makes the lawsuit a co-operative proceeding, in which
the court merely assists the parties to settle their own differences by stating to them the rules of law which govern
them.
*These considerations alone are enough to recommend the
practice in any country where respect for the rights of
others is considered a virtue. The force behind the court is
not at all weakened by it, for if it appears that the plaintiff's confidence in the defendant's readiness to do right is
misplaced, the coercive decree of the court is always ready
to be promptly issued in support of its declaration.
An entirely different situation, however, is presented in
those cases where no coercive relief can be granted. Here
there is an entire absence of a cause of action in the conventional sense. Since the defendant has not yet done or
" threatened anything wrong, nor failed to do all that is lawfully incumbent, upon him, there is nothing for the court to
operate upon, if we accept the definitions of a cause of action set forth in an earlier portion of this article. If
remedial rights arise only in support of primary rights infringed or threatened, there can be no remedial right of any
kind in such cases.
To account for the right to a declaratory judgment in
cases where no relief is possible, it seems necessary to-boldly
concede that the statute which authorizes it has creatednot
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a new remedy merely, but a new primary right. The old
primary rights were the correlatives of duties calling for
present action on the part of the defendant. These were in.
fringed when the defendant failed to do what the law required. They were all based oni a social system which considered justice as a by-product of force, and which saw no
need for judicial administration concerning itself with any
but wrongdoers. The common law never looked upon the
courts as agencies useful for enabling parties to keep out of
trouble. That was the business of the lawyers. It never
admi.tted that any one had a legal right to know what his
rights were.
The new rule authorizing declaratory judgments in cases
where no relief is possible, gives one the right to know his
rights. Since ignorance of the law excuses no one, the law
will furnish an oracle to declare it. Assuming that parties
intend to do right, it will point out the way they should go.
To use a homely figure, prior to 1883 the English courts
were employed only as repair shops, since that time they
have been operated as service stations.
The field which the new practice opens is a wide and fruitful one. It furnishes remedies which no civilized country
ought to deny to its citizens, and the lack of them is a serious hardship in this country.
The practice of making declarations of right has completely revolutionized English remedial law. The American
lawyer who peruses the current English reports is bewildered by their novelty. He is like a modern Rip Van
Winkle, who, having gone to sleep in an age when courts
were only the nemesis of wrongdoers, awakens to find that
they have become the guardians and advisers of those who
respect the law.
Outside of the States which have adopted the new practice, the only recourse of an American who wishes to get a
forecast of his rights is to consult his lawyer. But the lawyer's opinion is without the slightest binding force. Vast

COURTS AS AU'11ORIZIEI) LEGAL ADVISORS.

interests may be at stake, but all the client can do is to
gamble on the sagacity of his counsel.
In England such compulsory gambling has long been outgrown. The client consults his lawyer, the lawyer, in case of
doubt, frames a case for the court, and the court, on a full
hearing with all interested parties before it, makes a final
and binding declaration on which the client can act with
perfect security. The practice is so convenient and so
obviously advantageous that it has become almost a matter
of course in English chancery cases and is very common on
the law side of the court. An examination of a typical volune of Chancery i'eports, shows that out of 64 cases reported, 43 were brought for declarations of rights. It
would be safe to say that approximately two-thirds of the
current Chancery litigation in the Supreme Court of Judicature is directed to obtaining the advice of the court as to
rights of litigant parties, with or without prayers for consequential relief.
The cases in the volume of chancery reports above mentioned wilf' illustrate the nature and range of questions put
to the court for determination. Thus, in Lovesy v. Palmer, "3
plaintiff asked for a declaration that certain memoranda
and letters constituted a binding contract between the defendants and the plaintiff to make a lease of a theatre. In
Smith, Coney & Barrett v. Becker, Gray & Co.,2 4 the plaintiff asked for declarations that certain contracts which they
had made with defendants were illegal by reason of the
proclamation of a state of war between Great Britain and
Germany. In re Lodwig "- the plaintiff asked the court to
declare whether certain trusts were void for remoteness.
In re New Chinese Antimony Co., Lim., -6 the liquidator of a
company asked the court to determine and declare the correlative rights of the preferred and common shareholders in
the assets of the company. In re Chafer and Randall's Con23
24

(1916)
(1916)

2 Ch. 233.
2 Ch. 86.

25
26

(1916)
(1916)

2 Ch. 26.
2 Ch. 115.
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tract 2 plaintiff asked a declaration that the abstract of title
delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff did not show a
good title. In Cassel v. .Inglis8 plaintiff asked the court to
declare that he had been illegally excluded from membership in the Stock Exchange. In Coleman v. London County
and Westminister Bank, Lim.," the court was asked to decide the question of priorities in certain debentures as between the plaintiff and defendant. In Parsons v. Equitable
Investment Co., Lim., : the court was asked to declare that
a certain bill of sale was void because it failed to truly state
the consideration for which it was given. In Pearce v. Bulteel ' a declaration was asked as to who were the owners of
certain property. In Gilbert v. Gosport and Alverstoke
Urban District Council"2 plaintiff asked the court to de..
clare that he owned certain land free of any public right of
way. In a majority of the above cases there was a present
cause of action in the plaintiff, which was either utilized as
the basis for a claim for relief in addition to the declaration
of rights, or was abandoned in favor of the declaration as a
better remedy.
In at least twenty cases in the same volume the court was
asked to construe wills or make declarations as to rights
acquired under wills, involving such questions as :-whether
certain funds should be paid to a life tenant as income or
retaied by the trustees as capital,'" whether the words
"lawful issue'' were restricted to children or -included remoter descendants,"4 to what bequests a provision against
lapse applied," whether farm laborers were "servants"
within the meaning of a bequest," whether a devise of land
was subject to a water pipe easement"7 and many others,
most of them involving, but others not involving trusts.
The cases where a declaration of rights is the sole pos(1916)
(1916')
29 (1916)
30 (1916)
31 (1916)
32 (1916)
27

28

2 Ch.
2 Ch.
2 Ch.
2 Ch.
2 Ch.
2 Ch.

8.
211.
353.
527.
544.
587.

3

In re Thomas (1916), 2 Ch. 331.
re Timson (1916), 2 Ch. 362.
Is In re Smith (1916), 2 Ch. 368.
aoIn re Forrest (1916), 2 Ch. 386.
37 Schwann
v. Cotton (1916), 2
Ch. 459.
.14In
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sible remedy are not easy to classify. Perhaps no logical
classification is possible, for the whole matter of declaratory
judgments is discretionary with the court, and each case
seems to go on its own facts as an appeal to the exercise
of that discretion. The scope of the applications for such
declarations which the courts have approved maybe roughly
shown under the following heads, merely as a means of convenient presentation.
1. A'declaration of rights may be had where there is a
present possibility of immediately creating a cause of action, as by a demand or refusal, but the parties have not
done so, perhaps through reluctance to precipitate a conflict. This is the typical case for a friendly application to
the court. It avoids the necessity of formal hostilities, such
as American friendly suits require, and enables the parties
to show on the face of the record that there has been a forbearance of any peremptory action. Thus, while an action
on a contract, either for specific performance or damages,
requires the allegation and proof of a breach by the defendant,- a declaration of rights would seem to be available
without any such allegation.
In Williams, Hollins & Co., Lim., v. Paget,3 8 defendant
was a manager employed by tle plaintiff, under a salary and
a contract for additional compensation equal to 5 per cent
of any excess earned over and above full preferred dividends of 5 per cent and common dividends of 7 per cent. In
1915 the company made profits in excess of the pre-war
standard, so that an excess profits tax became payable
under the Finance Act. The question then arose whether
the manager's additional compensation should be estimated
before or after the deduction of the excess profits tax. Instead of creating a cause of action for damages by a demand
on the part of the manager for compensation on the higher
*

as (1917)

86 L. J. Ch. 287.

The

Castings Syndicate v. Etherington

same question was raised in Patent

VOL. LIV.

(1919)

12

88 L. J. Ch. 398.
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basis of computation, the parties obtained a declaration
from the court as to the true basis.
In Rawlinson v. Mort" the court made a declaration that
a certain organ, which had come rightfully into the possession of the defendants, was the property of the plaintiff, although no demand for it had ever been made upon the defendants.
In 1. Newsum & Co., Lim., v. Bradley, 0 the plaintiffs
were indorsees of bills of lading for the carriage of a cargo
of wood in defendant's steamship Jupiter from Archangel
to Hull. The ship was torpedoed by a German submarine,
and the crew were compelled by the enemy to leave her.
Subseqjuently she was towed into a Scottish port by a British patrol boat, and the plaintiffs claimed the right to take
possession of the goods without payment of freight. The
parties agreed to allow the ship to proceed with her cargo
to [lull subject to plaintiff's rights as of the date when she
lay in the Scottish port, and this action was commenced for
a declaration by the court as to what those rights were, no
demand or refusal appearing to have been made. The
declaration was given as asked by the plaintiffs.4
39 (1905)
40 (1917)

93 L. T. 555.
86 L. J. K. B. 1238.

41 There are many interesting recent c ses of this nature. In fe
Lavey, Trustee (1920) 89 L. J. K. B.
24: The trustee of a bankrupt's estate asked for a declaration that he
was entitled to certain earnings of
the bankrupt as forming part of the
property divisible among his creditors. Declaration made as asked.
In re Fr. Meyers Sohn, Ltd. (1918)
1 Ch. 169: Application by the alien
enemy property controller empowered to wind up a foreign company
for a declaration as to whether he
had a right to distribute assets in
his hands among the shareholders.
Declaration
given.
Krupp Aktiengesellschaft 'v. Orconera Iron
Ore Cc. (1919) 88 L. J. Ch. 304:
Action for a declaration that a cer-

tain agreement was dissolved by the
existence of a state of war. Given
as asked. Burns v. Siemens Bros.
Dynamo Works (1919) 88 L. J. Ch.
21: Action for a declaration that
shares of stock owned jointly by
plaintiff and. another could be required to be so entered on the company's books as to enable either one
of the joint owners to vote. Glasson v. Essex County Council (1919)
88 L. J. Ch. 439: A teacher asked
for a declaration that she was entitled to share in a supplementary
grant made for education by the
defendant, and it was declared that
she had no such right. Lee v.
Chartered
Institute
of
Patent
Agents (1919) 88 L. J. Ch. 319:
Action for a declaration that a resolution of defendant excluding
plaintiff from membership was invalid. Declaration made as asked.
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An extreniely large and varied class of cases of this kind
arises out of the construction of written instruments, fixing
the mutual rights of parties. Here present claims for relief might be created through action by one party hostile to
the rights asserted by another party, but'under order 54a,
rule 1, such a course is rendered entirely unnecessary. A
doubt having arisen as to the meaning or effect of the instrument, this is enough to make it possible for any party
concerned to present tothe court the question upon which
the doubt hinges.
A typical case is Cyclists' Touring Club v. Hopkinson, 2
where certain members of the plaintiff club desired to grant
a pension to the club's secretary, who had filled that office
for many years. A minority voted against the pension. The
question was raised whether under the articles of association such action would be valid, and this action was brought
solely to determine the question of power under the articles,
no action having been taken nor threatened pursuant to the
vote to grant the pension. The court declared that the
a pension would not be ultra vires.
granting of such
In re Smith 3 the plaintiffs asked the court to declare
that
.by virtue of a certain contract made by them with one
Smith, in his lifetime, they were entitled to have Smith's
executors execute to them a legal mortgage upon certain
property belonging to the estate as security for certain
advances. The declaration was made.
4
Similar instances might be indefinitely multiplied. 1
American practice has limited bills for instructions to cases
where there is some independent ground of equitable juris45
diction, such as trusts.
101 L. T. 848.
2 Ch. 206.
in re Knight's Settled Estates (1918) 1 Ch. 211: An application by a life tenant for a declaration whether he had the right to
sell certain property to provide
money to pay the estate duty.
In re Dott's
Declaration given.
42 (1909)
43 (1916)
44 Thus,

Lease (1920)

89 L. J. Ch. 15: A

lessee of a theater, under covenant
not to reduce the prices of admission "as now charged" without the
lessor's consent, asked and obtained
a declaration that he was entitled
-to raise prices without the consent
of the lessor.
45 1 Whitehouse Equity, Sec. 129.

54.

AMERICAN

LAW REVIEW.

2. Where one party only has a present right of action for
legal or equitable relief, but the other will suffer a serious
prejudice by delay in bringing it into court, the latter may
have a declaration of rights.
Under the usual American practice the courts can give
the latter party no relief. He must helplessly wait until the
party who has the cause of action chooses to sue him, even
though the delay serves only to pile up the damages which
he may eventually have to pay.
For example, suppose A claims that B is infringing his
patent. B has a cause of action of the conventional type,
but A has not. B can sue A but A cannot sue B. B may
have a large investment in the machinery for making the disputed device, and May have spent large sums in advertising
it. Upon B's assertion of patent rights A must either discard his machinery, abandon his investment,' and lose the
good will he has built np, or continue to operate under the
constant threat of an action for damages whenever A thinks
that sufficiently large damages have accrued to make a lawsuit a profitable venture. If a declaration of rights could
be had, the manufacturer could at once apply for a determination of the validity of the asserted patent, and thus
save himself from the risk of serious loss and injury.
Such was the case presented in North Eastern Marine Engineering Co. v. Leeds Forge Co.," where defendants
claimed that plaintiffs were infringing their patents. Plaintiffs asked for a declaration that defendants' patents were
invalid and that plaintiffs had not invaded any of defendants' legal rights. The court held that the giving of declaratory judgments was discretionary, and that in this
case there was an adequate remedy provided by the Patents,
Designs and Trademarks Act, namely, a petition for the
revocation of the patent, hence no declaration would be
made. But in the court of appeal, upon a showing that such
a petition had already been presented, but leave to file it
46 (1906)

1 Ch. 324.
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had, been refused for the probable reason that the patent
had expired, a declaration was made that the mere fact of
the expiration of the patent was not sufficient to justify the
Attorney-General in refusing permission to file a petition
for revocation. The whole course of reasoning of the court
sustains the conclusion that if the plaintiff had been without
any other remedy, as of course he would have been in the
United States, 7 a declaration of rights as requested might
have been made.
Another common instance of such a situation occurs
where one makes separate contracts with two other parties,
and one or each of the latter claims that his contract is
broken by the contract with the other, as where two jobbers
each claim exclusive rights in the same territory under separate contracts with the manufacturer. Here the manufacturer has -no present cause of action for relief, arid can
only wait until sued by one or both of the jobbers. This
situation is always possible where contemporary contracts
are made with different persons respecting the same subject matter. Provision for declarations of rights would
offer a satisfactory solution and would merely put into
force the equitable rule of mutuality of remedy. 48
47 The
remedy
offered
under
American practice is limited to a
finding upon conflicting patents. U.
S. R. C., Sec. 4918. In his forthcoming book on The Law of Patents
and Inventions, Prof. John B. Waite
comments on the unsatisfactory
state of American remedial law as
follows: "It is a serious defect in
the patent law that it does not furnish any practical method by which
the individual can protect himself
against the menace and extortionate monopolies of invalid patents
It may be that in time an action of
some form will be provided, whereby one who honestly doubts the validity of an existing patent can get
the judgment of a court, without
having to await the dangerous convenience of the patentee," and he

cites, as a striking example of the
evils of the American remedial system, the case of Electric Renovator
Co. v. Vacuum Cleaner Co. (1911)
189 Fed. 754, where it appeared that
the renovator company had for
years continued the practice of
frightening off customers of the
Vacuum
Cleaner
Company
by
charges of patent infringement,
while at the same time it. persistently refused to bring suit to test
the validity of its patent which it
alleged the Vacuum Cleaner Co. was
infringing.
48 In Tozier v. Viola (1918) 1 Ch.
75, a lessee asked a declaration
against his lessor that a twenty-one
year lease had determined by operation of the Emergency Powers Act
because the lessee's assignor had be-

54.

AMERICAN LAW

REVIEW.

3. Where the plaintiff has no ground for relief but there
is a probability, though not a threat, that the defendant
may assert rights hostile to him, a declaration of rights
may be had.
In Hopkinson v. Mortimer, Harley & Co.,4" plaintiff was
the owner of full paid shares in defendant company. The
company added a provision to their articles that the lien
and right of forfeiture which it had always had on part
paid shares for debts due the company should be extended
to full paid shares. The company disclaimed any intention
of exercising this power. The plaintiff asked for a declaration that his full paid shares were not subject to forfeiture.
It was held that this was a proper declaration and not premature, as his rights were invaded by the mere passage of
the resolution.
In Evling v. Israel & Oppenheimer," a holder of common
stock in a company applied for a declaration as to his rights
as a common shareholder in the profits of the company, as
against the holders of preference stock. The declaration
was given.
4. Where a cause of action for relief is in a condition
which might be called inchoate, and lapse of time is necessary to perfect it, the court will declare the rights of the
parties .1
come a soldier and had been released from his obligation in respect of the lease.
Declaration
given. Under common law practice
a lessee who wishes to abandon a
lease carl never find out whether he
can lawfully do it, but must await
the pleasure of the lessor who may
sue when he pleases.
4) (1917) 86 L. J. Ch. 467.
50 (1918) 1 Ch. 101.
,1 Even before 1852, when the first
legislation authorized declaratory
judgments in England, courts of
chancery had sometimes undertaken to pronounce such judgments,
and they were deemed only technically irregular. Thus, in Curtis v.

Sheffield (1882), 21 Ch. D. 1, it appeared that in 1836 in an administration suit, Vice-Chancellor -Shadwell made seven declarations of
right as to seven legacies given by
the will of the testator. "He declared
the rights of the parties entitled
to present interests, and also their
rights in the future after the deaths
of the various tenants for life. Those
declarations were made in the presence of all the children of the testator who were then living-they
appear to have been of age, and
they appeared by counsel and
argued the various questions which
were decided by the court. Now It
is true that it is not the practice
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In Austen v. Collins5 2 a will created a life estate with successive remainders, with the proviso that if any devisee
should refuse or neglect for one year to take and bear the
surname and arms of Austen, then the devise should terminate, and the property should at once go to the person
next in remainder. The plaintiff was the life tenant, and
after the College of Arms had refused him permission to
use the arms required, and before the year had elapsed, he
asked for a declaration that he had not forfeited his life
estate. The declaration was made as asked.
In West v. Lord Sackville"3 the plaintiff claimed that he
was the lawful and eldest son of Lord Sackville, defendant'
and was entitled uder a certain settlement to an estate in
tail male, expectant on the decease of Lord Sackville, in the
family estates. He alleged that he could not bring his claim
to trial during the lifetime of Lord Sackville, and brought
this action to perpetuate testimony as to his claims. This
relief was denied, but Stirling, J., suggested that in his
opinion an action might have been brought under order 25,
rule 5, for a declaration of his title to the estates as tenant
in tail in remainder expectant on the death of his father.
In Powell & Thomas v. Evans Jones & Co. 4 defendants
of the court, and was not the practice of the Court of Chancery, to
decide as to future rights, but to
wait until the event has happened,
unless a present right depends on
the decisions, or there are some
other special circumstances to satisfy the court that it is desirable at
once to decide on the future rights.
,But where all the parties who in
any event will be entitled to the
property are of age and are ready
to argue the case, the reason of the
rule departs, and it becomes a bare
technicality. The reason for the
rule is this, that the court will not
decide on future rights, because until the event happens it does not
know who may be interested in
arguing the question, and therefore
may be shutting out parties who,
when the event happens, may be en-

titled to succeed, but where they are
all of age, and every possible party
is represented before the court, as I
said before, utility seems to say
that there should' be a power to determine their rights, as is the case
in Scotland and in many other
countries."-Jessel, M. R.
The opinion proceeds to say that
there probably were not any special
circumstances in this case, because
Vice-Chancellor Shadwell frequently
disregarded the rule, but at most it
was a technical irregularity, and
the plaintiff, the surviving child,
cannot now re-open the question,
but is bound by the orignal declarations.
52 (1886)
54 L. T. 903.
53

(1903) 2 Ch. 378.

54 (1905) 1 K. B. 11.

184-

54.

AMERICAN LAW

REVIEW.

filed a counterclaim against an agent for the portion of his
commission which had already been paid to him, on the
theory that he had received the same to defendants' use,
and then asked for and obtained a declaration that he would
become indebted to them for any further sums when and
as he should receive them on account of said commission.
5. When the plaintiff has and can have no cause of action for relief, but his dealings with third persons depend
ol the determination of questions arising between himself
and the, defendant, a declaration of rights will be made.
In Jenkins v. Price,5" the lessee of a hotel wished to assign her lease, but under its terms could not do so without
the lessor's consent, unless such consent was unreasonably
refused. The lessor refused. The lessee, in order to place
herself in a position where she could deal with her proposed assignee, asked for a declaration that the refusal was
unreasonable and released her from the restriction against
assignment. This declaration was made.
Another case very similar to the last is West v. Gwynne"
where a lease contained a condition against underletting unless, with the consent of the lessor. Plaintiffs, who were
lessees by assignment, asked permission to relet, but the
lessor refused, except on condition that he should receive
one-half the surplus rental the plaintiffs were to obtain.
Plaintiffs, believing that this condition was invalid under
the Conveyancing Act, asked for a declaration to that effect; and the court so declared."'
Lord Justice Vaughan Williams, in a similar case"8 used
very strong language in support of the practice, saying:
" . . It seems to me that it would be quite shocking if
the court could not put an end to the dispute in the way the
learned judge has done by this order. I mean it would be
quite shocking if . . . the court were bound to say, 'Al(1907) 2 Ch. 229.
56 (1911) 2 Ch: 1.
57 A similar declaration was made
55

in Evans v. Levy (1910), 1 Ch. 452.
58 Young v. Ashley Garden Properties, Lim. (1903), 2 Ch. 112.
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though we have the whole matter before us . . . we must
leave matters in this state, that the landlord may continue
to abstain from granting his license and the tenant must
assign at his own risk-that is, at the risk of forfeiture.'
And Cozens-Hardy, L. J., said in the same case, "I cannot
imagine a more judicious or beneficial exercise of the jurisdiction to make a declaratory order than that which has
been adopted by Joyce, J. in this case."
A similar situation arises in case of attempted sales of
property in which others claim rights. The prospective purchaser does not care to buy a lawsuit, and only by a declaration of right against the claimant can the title be made merchantable in cases where a bill to quiet title would not lie.
Thus, in re Burroughs-Fowler, 0 an antenuptial settlement conveyed real and personal property to trustees to
sell-the same and pay the rents, profits and income to the
husband during his life or until he should be declared bankrupt or subject to certain other conditions. The husband
was later adjudicated a bankrupt, and the trustee in bankruptcy offered this life interest of the bankrupt for sale,
but the prospective purchaser objected that this life interest was defeasible. The trustee in bankruptcy thereupon
applied for a declaration that lie was able to convey a good
title to an indefeasible life interest of the bankrupt, and the
court so declared.
•I re Trafford's Settled Estates"0 the applicant wished to
sell certain lands which he acquired under a will, freed from
certain annuities which were created by the same will. He
could do so only if he was a person having the powers of a
tenant for life, and asked for a declaration that he had such
powers. The court decided the question so presented.
59 (1916) 2 Ch. 251.
6 (1915) 1 Ch. 9.
61
In re Phillips (1919), 88 L. J.
Ch. 28, was an- action for a declaration that a certain marriage between a man and the daughter of
his deceased wife's brother was

valid, and consequently that the
plaintiff, a child of the marriage,was legitimate. Declaration made
that the marriage was not valid.
In re Plymouth Corporation and
Walter (1918) 2 Ch. 354, was a case
where the corporation of plymouth
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6. Where there is no present cause of action in the ordinary sense but the accrual of such a cause of action will
subject the plaintiff to the risk of penalties, the court will
declare the rights of the parties.
In such a case the plaintiff is not required to incur the
risk of the penalties, but may obtain a declaration to inform
himself of his rights in anticipation of penal liability. The
question was thoroughly argued in a number of cases involving the inquisitorial powers of crown officers, and the
judges all agreed that the anticipatory declaration of rights
was an eminently suitable remedy.
Thus, in Burghes v. Attorney General1 2 the Conmissioners of Internal Revenue had required plaintiff to make certain returns respecting rents paid out or received, for the
purpose of fixing duties on land values. The plaintiff
asked the court for a declaration that he was not bound to
give the information demanded. Warrington, J., said:
"It is contended that there is no cause of action against
the Crown or its officers, that they have broken no contract
and have done the plaintiff no legal wrong, nor do they
threaten to do so. But order 25, r. 5, is intended to deal
with the very case-that is, one in which no relier can be
claimed either by way of damages for the past or an injunction for the future, and, in fact, in several cases declarations have been made under this order where there was no
cause of action in the proper sense . . .
"The complaint is that officers of the Crown are demanding information they are not entitled to, and, to say the
least of it, reminding the subject of unpleasant consequences which may ensue if it is refused.- It seems to me
immaterial whether the terms of the notice amount to an
actual threat; the reference to the penalty is plainly intended to intimate to the plaintiff that compliance can, and
agreed with Walter to sell to him
certain property within the borough
belonging to the ancient estates of
the corporation, and Walter objected to the title tendered on the
ground that the corporation had no
power to sell without the consent

of the local government board. Action was brought to determine
whether, the corporation had the
power asserted, and the declaration
was made that it did not.
62 (1911)
2 Ch. 139, 155.
-
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will, be compelled if necessary. If the question be not decided in this way it must be left open until the plaintiff,
having refused to comply, is sued for penalties, and the
plaintiff would be left in a position of great perplexity. In
my opinion, the mode adopted by the plaintiff for obtaining
a decision is a very convenient one, enabling the Commissioners to be informed how far they may go, and relieving
the plaintiff from the doubt and perplexity into which he
has been cast."
Another action of the same kind was brought in the
King's Bench Division, and the Court of Appeal took the
same view as Warrington, J., in the Burghes case. This
was Dyson v. Attorney General,"3 in which Farwell, L. J.,
speaking in the Court of Appeal, said:
."It is obviously a question of the greatest importance;
more than eight millions of Form IV (the form on which
the information was required to be given) have been sent
out in England, and the questions asked entail much trouble
and in many cases considerable expense in answering; it
would be a blot on our system of law and procedure if there
is no way by which a decision on the true limit of the power
of inquisition vested in the Commissioners can be obtained
by any member of the public aggrieved, without putting
himself in the invidious position of being sued for a penalty . . . The next argument on the Attorney General's
behalf was 'ab inconvenienti;' it was said that if an action
of this sort would lie there would be innumerable actions
for declarations as to the meaning of numerous Acts, adding greatly to the labors of the law officers. But the court
is not bound to make declaratory orders and would refuse
to do so unless in proper cases, and would punish with costs
persons who might bring unnecessary. actions: there is no
substance in the apprehension, but if inconvenience is a legitimate consideration at all, the convenience in the public interest is all in favor of providing a speedy and easy access
to the courts for any of His Majesty's subjects who have
any real cause of complaint against the exercise of statutory powers by government departments and government
officials, having regard to their growing tendency to claim
63 (1911)

1 K. B. 410, 421 ff.
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-the right to act without regird to legal principles and without appeal to any Court . . . If ministerial responsibility
were more than the mere shadow of a name, the matter
would be less important, but as it is, the courts are the only
defense of the liberty of the subjects against departmental
aggression.'
And still later, in Dyson v. Attorney General,"4 the Court
of Appeal repeated the same views very strongly, Fletcher
Moulton, L. J., saying:" . . I think that an action thus
framed is the most convenient method of enabling the subject to test the justifiability of proceedings on the part of
permanent officials purporting to act under statutory provisions.
One of the latest cases of this kind is Ertel Bieber & Co.
v. Rio Tinto Co."5 The Rio Tinto Company, which was
English, owned mines in Spain, and was under contract to
sell to the plaintiffs, which were German companies doing
business in England, several million tons of ore over i
period of four years, for delivery at various continental
ports. The question arose whether these contracts were
abrogated by the British Trading With the Enemy Act.
Under the ordinary American practice the Rio Tinto Company would have been faced with the dilemma of going
ahead with the contracts and incurring the risk of penalties
under the Act, or stopping performance and laying itself
open to actions for heavy damages. What it did was to
commence an action for a declaration that it was no longer
bound by the contracts, and the declaration was promptly
made by the court.
7. Where plaintiff as a strict matter of law, has a right
to an injunction, yet on account of the peculiar facts of the
case the court may prefer to substitute a declaration of
right as a more suitable remedy.
In Vestry of St. Mary, Islington v. Hornsby Urban Dis64 (1912) 1 Ch. 158, 168. See also
China Mutual Steam Nay. Co. v.

MacLay ('1917) 1 K. B. 33.
65 (1918) H. L. 260.
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trict Council,6 6 the plaintiffs, a metropolitan vestry, agreed
to allow defendants, a district outside the metropolitan area
to discharge their sewage into plaintiff's sewer, but after
many years' operation it was found that this additional
sewage periodically stopped up plaintiffs' sewer. The
agreement was vltra vires and void. The plaintiffs sought
an injunction to restrain defendants from discharging sewage into plaintiff's sewers. It was held that while the court
had power to grant the injunction, yet, in view of the difficulty in which it would place defendants if obliged to close
sewers in daily use, the court would only make a declaration
establishing plaintiffs' right to relief, to give defendants
time to make other arrangements, with leave to apply for an
injunction after the expiration of a reasonable time.
In Llandudno Urban District Council v. Woods, 7 the
plaintiffs were the local authority of Llandudno, and the
seashore at that point between high and low watermark was
vested in them under a lease from the Crown. Defendant
was a clergyman of the Church of England, and asked permission to hold religious services on the beach. Plaintiffs
refused, but the defendant held them notwithstanding. The
plaintiff asked a declaration that defendant was not entitled to make addresses or hold meetings on the shore at
Liandudno without their conisent, and an injunction. It was
held that since the plaintiffs possess the legal right to prohibit any one from coming upon the shore, the declaration
asked will have to be given, but the matter is too trivial to
merit the use of an injunction.
8. Where relief can only be granted in a foreign jurisdiction, the respective rights of the parties may be fixed
by a declaratiol as an aid to the foreign adjudication.
In The Manar, 8 the plaintiffs were mortgagees of the
British ship Manar, and on default in payment of the mortgage they had taken possession and chartered the ship for
66 (1900)
67 (1899)

1 Ch. 695.
2 Ch. 705.

68

(1903) p. 95.
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a voyage to France. On arrival there the defendants,
Strachan Brothers, British subjects, arrested the ship and
freight, claiming as creditors of the mortgagors for necessaries furnished to the ship. It appeared to be in dispute
whether the French court would apply the English law in
determining whether the plaintiffs as mortgagees or the
defendants as necessaries men were entitled to the possession of the ship and freight. The plaintiffs asked for a
declaration that they were entitled to the ship and freight
as against defendants. It was held that since it was not
clear from the evidence what effect a judgment in this action would have in France, and since it had not been shown
that the declaration sought would not be of practical utility
to plaintiffs in the French court, the declaration would be
given.
Two points in connection with the practice of declaring
rights should be emphasized.
First. It does not contemplate the hearing of moot or
abstract' cases by the courts. In every case there is an
actual controversy between parties who urge conflicting
claims."
Second. It has nothing in common with the practice provided for in a few States, whereby the executive or legislative department of the State may call upon the supreme
court for its opinion upon important questions of law, or
whereby the court may render judgment in advance upon
the legality of municipal action. The difficulty with this
procedure is that the court does not have the benefit of argument by interested parties, nor is it able to gauge the
effect of a decision disassociated from the saving restrictions of a concrete case. The declaratory judgment is always the result of an actually litigated concrete controversy between parties who represent every interest involved and are actually before the court.
The foregoing review of the salient features of the Eng,Clay v. Booth (1919) 88 L. J. Ch. 40.
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lish practice demonstrates the value of the declaration of
rights on the law as well as on the equity side of the court,
thus indicating the superiority of the Michigan act over
those of Wisconsin and Florida. It is probable that the
most important use of this remedy in strictly legal actions
occurs in the Commercial Court in England. In the very
recent case of Spettabile Consorzio Veneziano, Etc., v.
Northumberland Shipbuilding Co.,7" brought in the commercial court, the plaintiffs were shipowners in Italy and entered into contracts with defendants, an English shipbuilding company, by which the latter were to build them a number. of ships. In view of subsequent dealings between the
parties, the plaintiffs believed that the contracts were no
longer in force, and they asked for a declaration to that effect. The judge of the commercial court said: "In this
case I am asked to exercise, I .think, one of the most useful
functions of the commercial court-namely, to say between
parties to contracts whether those contracts are still binding upon them. That is a function of the court which saves
parties in commercial transactions from a great deal of uncertainty and a great deal of money. It is a function which
this court is always pleased to exercise when asked, and T
desire to say that in cases of this kind the court is always
ready to have it at the shortest possible notice.''
Declarations of rights are peculiarly appropriate to commercial controversies, especially if there is an available
means of getting prompt decisions, and the quick action of
the commercial court in England doubtless increases the
value of this remedy. ' The distinctive feature of the Michi70

(1919)

121 L. T. 628.

71 In Guaranty Trust Co. of New

York v. A. Hannay & Co. (1918) 23
Com. Cas. 399, a declaration was
asked that the plaintiff bank was
riot liable to repay to the defendants, cotton buyers of Liverpool,
money paid by the defendants in respect of a draft with a forged bill
of lading attached for cotton which

the plaintiff bank had purchased
from the drawers. London Joiit
Stock Bank v. Macmillan and Arthur (1918) 23 Com. Cas. 415, was
an action to have it declared that
the defendant bank was not entitled to debit the plaintiffs, who
were depositors in the bank, with a
certain check drawn by them upon
the bank, which had been fraudu-
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gan act which allows actions brought for declarations. only,
to have the speedy right of way of a motion, will give this
act a similarly useful place in commercial litigation.
It is quite startling to American complacency to see what
strides England and her dominions have made in remedial law while we remained under the stagnating spell of the
common law conception of judicial functions. We canonized
the ancient tradition of a cause of action in all its original
crudeness and made it the conditioii and the measure of
judicial action. We have at last begun to see the far-reaching possibilities of preventive relief-prevention not merely
of threatened wrongs but prevention of uncertainty and
misunderstanding in the assertion of rights. There is nothing experimental in the new practice. It has been tested by
nearly forty years of daily use in English speaking courts.
With last year's legislation as a promising beginning it
may be confidently hoped that before many years our State
and Federal courts everywhere will exercise a similar
power in aid of the law-abiding citizen who wishes to know
Jiis rights and do his duty.
EDSON R. SUNDERLAND,

Law School, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, Mich.
lently raised. In Naylor, Benzon & tract made in 1912 for the sale of
Co. v. Kraenische Industrie Gesell- iron ore by an English company,to
schaft (1918) 23 Com. Cas. 398, a
an Austrian company was disdeclaration was asked that a con- " solved by the outbreak of the war.

